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BRIEF MENTION.

A familiar illustration of the ruling passion strong in death is furnished by the dying words of the old French grammarian: 'Je vais ou je vas mourir; l'un et l'autre se disent'; and I suppose that I shall continue to repeat my little syntactical formulae to the end. Even in this day of wrath, when the jar of conflict is felt to the remotest verge of the world, I find myself repeating the statement: Verbs of vision in Greek as a rule take present and perfect participles. These are the ordinary conditions of actual vision. There are two notorious exceptions—*ἐπιδῆν*, 'to live to see', and *περιδῆν*, 'to fail to see'. These are often followed by the aorist participle. The negative explanation of *περιδῆν*, which I adduced years and years ago (Morris-Classen Thuk. I, 24; A. J. P. X 124), is not wholly satisfactory. The verbs are not to be separated. They are not verbs of vision pure and simple. They have a moral sense. They involve will and wish. *περιδῆν* may be a wilful ignoring, 'to shut one's eyes to'; *ἐπιδῆν* involves desire or dread. Alas for life as mirrored in language! Scan the passages in which *ἐπιδῆν* occurs. It is enough to make one a pessimist. But I drop the grammarian, and leave the statistics to those who are carried away with the *furor arithmeticus*.

What have I not lived to see, if only from afar. My memory goes back to the Seminole war, and as a child I went to Fort Moultrie in order to get sight of Osceola; but the hero was not on exhibition that day. I was only to see his grave; and from that time on war has followed war—almost every one brought to the consciousness by personal interest or personal contact with the actors. I have lived through four years of the Civil War—more than four years, if one counts prelude and postlude of the great red game. I know the life of the fireside and the life of the field. The conditions of the present wrestling-match—the grimmest of the ages—are different, but at bottom war is the same. I think of the scholars that have taken the field on this side and that. Some of them I know personally. I understand them. Paul Cauer's *Grammatica Militans*, ominous title, is on my study table. I open the last number of the 1914 *Jahrbücher*, and learn that he is in the field. Ilberg tarries by the stuff. To judge by my own

experience the man in the field is the happier. The first article is by WILHELM NESTLE. It deals with Thukydides. This is my Aristophanic year, but Aristophanes means the Peloponnesian War, and the Peloponnesian War is the pivot about which so much of my work as a teacher revolves. The note-books from which these trivialities are taken bear Aristophanic titles—*σκαριφισμοί*, *κοσκυλμάτια*, *πομφολυγοπαφλάσματα*, but of the two interpreters of that typical struggle I find myself turning from the comic mask of the 'baldhead bard' to the grave countenance of the historian; and Thukydides shall be the chief contributor to the *Brief Mention* of this number.

NESTLE's article is a companion-piece to his Euripides (A. J. P. XXIII 111) and is called *Thukydides u. die Sophistik*. To him Thukydides is the 'Geschichtschreiber der griechischen Aufklärung', as Euripides is the 'Dichter der griechischen Aufklärung', though the natures of the two rationalists are far different. Thukydides' rupture with the traditional religion is more complete than that of Euripides, whose poetical soul longs every now and then for the old faith (A. J. P. XXX 227). Thukydides simply ignores the gods <E. caelo deripit ille deos>. A striking contrast is Herodotos, who, while he could not withdraw himself from the mighty movement of the times, went no farther than a rather tame rationalism, <after a fashion that reminds one of Pindar and Palaiphatos>. But for Herodotos the moral government of God abides; <for him an increasing purpose runs through the ages>. He looks upon the world with the artistic vision of Aischylos or Sophokles, rather than with the cold eye and cool blood of the investigator of history. <He is, in short, a good Church of Greece man (A. J. P. XVII 127).> Thukydides' programme is not the momentary diversion of hearer or reader, but the ascertainment of the truth (*τὸ σαφές*). <Only *τὸ σαφές* is not *τὸ ὄν*. It is non-committal, as is so much in Thukydides.> This bent toward the real, this *Wirklichkeits-sinn*, shews itself, says NESTLE, in the pragmatic character of Thukydides' work and style. <If the world were only agreed on the meaning of 'pragmatic! '> It is not necessary, therefore, to advance as an explanation the northern barbaric blood that flowed in his veins (cf. A. J. P. XXXIII 238), as did Wilamowitz, <despite the fact that Karl Blind claimed him as a German, and the other fact that the Holkham bust has the type of an English gentleman—an untranslatable type>. This makes him, according to NESTLE <and a thousand others>, the first historian in the modern sense, <despite the deliberate limitation of his vision, which forms a striking contrast to the

wider sweep which makes Herodotos akin to the historians of to-day (A. J. P. XVII 127)>.

Thukydides' passion for the truth is not a flame, but a hidden fire. He is not a propagandist. In religious matters he maintains <the> reserve <of the superior person>. He recognizes religion as a power; <he would have recognized it in Cromwell and his Ironsides>. When he develops his own views, he refrains from any religious philosophy. Note the eloquent silence in his introduction. But we must remember that the philosophic content of his work resides in the speeches, and we must not attribute to him the sentiments of his characters. He is a dramatic poet. His work is an historical drama, as Otfried Müller puts it. <Indeed, Mr. Cornford frankly calls him 'mythistoricus' (A. J. P. XXVIII 356)>. Far different are his *δημηγορίαι* from the discourses of Herodotos. Like the tragic poets, Herodotos uses his *sermones* to open our vision into the dealings, <into the *poscaenia*>, of the divinity. Thukydides, like an apt pupil of the sophists, builds his speeches in the main on the *ἀντιλέγειν* business, but in spite of his art we can see behind the mask of the speaker the clear and serious eye of the writer. <A difficult matter, Herr NESTLE, if it were not for the simple rule given by Bury. According to Bury, the harder Thukydides is to understand, the more perverse his style, the nearer are we to the real Thukydides.> Like the sophists, Thukydides is averse from speculative philosophy. Antiquity has called him a pupil of Anaxagoras, and branded him as an atheist, <though, to be sure, *ἄθεος* does not mean atheist in the modern sense>, but there is no *Νοῦς* (with a capital N) in Thukydides. Earthquakes, inundations, volcanic eruptions, eclipses, tempests, are mentioned, but only because of their historical consequences or their effect on popular belief; nor does he spare the superstition of a statesman and a general of whom he thought so highly as he thought of Nikias, <though what he really thought of Nikias is another story>. His famous description of the plague shews how thoroughly trained he was in the observation of natural phenomena—<a vivid description, indeed, in which modern physicians have seen every kind of contagion, bubonic plague, syphilis, what not?> All that happens is to him the working of an unvarying machine. He believes in the 'Gesetzmässigkeit alles Geschehens', and we trace in him the teachings of Demokritos. The law of uniformity that he recognizes in the world without, he recognizes also in human nature, which the sophists regarded as the proper study of mankind. The soul of Sophistic is intellec-

tualism. There is no ethical judgment of actions—no good, no bad, no ὕβρις, only ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in the sense of adaptation of means to end. His whole terminology is intellectual, not ethical. σύνεσις was the watchword of his time. πρόνοια is human foresight, not divine. In his ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας he discards myth and anecdote, <though he is not proof against *bons mots*—Who is?> For him there was no golden age; nor any speculations as to primitive man. He is on his guard against exaggeration of former exploits. To him the Peloponnesian war was greater than the Trojan. He uses his Homer as evidence of social and cultural conditions, and recognizes an advance, <though there is no divine plan for the education of the race, no modern God in History, no ratchet-wheel movement from without>. No myths of the gods. No enthusiasms about heroes. The Trojan war he considers historical. <If he lived in our day, he would have escaped the sun-stroke, cf. A. J. P. XXIX 117)>.

In NESTLE'S opinion there was no recognition of a ‘sittliche Weltordnung’, no sublimation of Τύχη into Providence, <no ἰοχέαιρα Τύχη, no Διὸς πлагὰν ἔχουσιν εἰπεῖν, A. J. P. XXIII 347.> Chance is sheer chance, <not even as Swinburne has it, ‘chance central of circumstance’>. Cult and violations of cult are mentioned only when they are significant for the course of events, nor always without an intimation of the insincerity or the weakness of those who used them or were swayed by them. For the whole brood of soothsayers, the whole apparatus of oracles, he does not pretend to disguise his contempt, <any more, say, than our orthodox friend Aristophanes>.

τὸ θεῖον is a mere δόξα. The only rule to follow is the φύσις ἀναγκαία, the inviolable rule to which the world within is subject, as is the world without. There is no ethic even when a definite personality speaks. <Why then make allowances, as NESTLE bids us do?> The God Pan has nothing to do with panic, <any more than the σχῆμα Πινδαρικόν has to do with Pindar.> Scares are catching, that is all. The Spartans march to the sound of the fife, not for the sake of τὸ θεῖον, but simply because of the psychological effect of music <a familiar doctrine from Tyrtaos to Rudyard Kipling—but no details are given as to the character of Dorian moods and Lydian airs>. Crime and punishment—everyday themes with the Sophists—are discussed in the speech of Diodotos: πεφύκασί τε ἅπαντες καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἀμαρτάνειν. <But ἀμαρτάνειν is not to be

rendered 'Verbrechen' (A. J. P. XXXV 386) as it is rendered by NESTLE>. Human nature is prone to make mistakes—so prone that no law, no νόμος—<for νόμος is not 'law'>—can check it. Such is human nature, and such it will ever be. The only wickedness is weakness of judgment. The trouble must be met by intelligence—<Jefferson's remedy>. Punishment as vengeance, <I will repay, saith the Lord> as a deterrent, as a means of reformation, is naught. τιμωρία and κόλασις are naught. 'Tis a pessimistic creed: σύνεσις cannot make head against ἐπιθυμία. φύσις gets the better of νόμος more and more. He says, as Euripides says, μέγιστον ἄρ' ἦν ἡ φύσις. <Nay, he is one with Pindar in the exaltation of φύσις, and Isokrates was to be one with both.> Thukydides is an aristocrat at heart. NESTLE has not recognized any special use of ἀρετή in Thukydides. He employs it, we are told, in the usual significance of the word. <But the Thukydidean theory reduces it, as I have said, to 'efficiency' (A. J. P. XXXV 367)—the adaptation of means to an end. ἀρετή consists in getting things done. It lacks moral content as much as does its antithesis ἀμαρτία. νόμος is Use and Wont. Its sway was recognized by Pindar, who made it an absolute rule—νόμος τύραννος>. The law of nature is the rule of the stronger for the world without. It is also the law of the world within. Might makes right. The only check is the inevitable law of decay—the inevitable ups and downs of life. The whole scheme is dramatically worked out in the debate between Melians and Athenians. The Athenians are ruthless in the proclamation of their programme. Thukydides points no moral. <It is the old, old story—An nescis longas regibus esse manus? The Melian Aphrodite is powerless. She has lost her arms. What Athens was to lose afterwards matters not—the awful sequel of the 'Wille zur Macht', of which one hears so much nowadays>. Classen would have us believe that Thukydides is following the lines of documents preserved in the archives of Athens, <a notion begotten by German practise>. Nay, says NESTLE. The dialogue is a sophistic debate in which the traditional view of the course of this world is upheld against the real laws that regulate the currents of events. It is an ἀντιλογία, which, however, leaves us in no doubt as to the side which Thukydides accepts <we must not say Thukydides 'favors'>. But form and content go back to sophistic exemplars, to Gorgias, to Euripides. We hear the echo in the ἀγών of the Clouds; and the anonymous Athenians of the Melian dialogue find their spokesman in the Kallikles of Plato's Gorgias and the Menon of the Anabasis. In political life the doctrine 'Might makes right' is accepted as the practical formula. Moral indignation is out of place in calculating the forces of history. Nietzsche interprets the dialogue as Nietzsche might

be expected to interpret it. <Indeed, Nietzsche, whose boyhood was influenced by Theognis (A. J. P. XXXIII 106), may in riper years have been inspired by Thukydides (A. J. P. XXII 232)>. Nor does NESTLE spare us the inevitable parallel of Machiavelli. <Unfortunately, Thukydides offers no parallel for the trumpet-note of Petrarch, which forms the memorable close of 'Il Principe'—a note that resounds and will resound through the ages so long as there is such a thing as nationality.>

This brings us to the chapter of Thukydides' attitude toward the parties of his day. He is no believer in political Utopias. Himself an aristocrat, he maintains his independence of oligarchs and democrats alike, and declares himself in favor of the compromise government of the Five Thousand as the best he had lived to see <a bitterer sarcasm than is to be found in Tacitus>. 'Ομόνοια was the watchword of the time, as it is the title of a discourse of Antiphon the Sophist, whom NESTLE is inclined to identify with Antiphon the statesman, whom Thukydides praises as he praises Nikias <both eulogies open to interpretation, for as NESTLE himself says, all Thukydides' estimates of character are based on political evidence, quite apart from what we should call moral standards>. The Epitaphios of Pericles is a glorification of Athenian culture, of the Athenian spirit—not of Athenian political life. <'Ομόνοια, by the way, is the name of one of the two great squares of Modern Athens (Place de la Concorde). One wonders what Thukydides would have thought of the Greeks of to-day.> NESTLE seems to think that Thukydides favored the régime of the μέσοι πολῖται, <but for that matter Pindar has been claimed for the same régime (I. E. xxvi), and with as much foundation>. His ideal—if he had any ideal—was the one man rule of Perikles. For the ὄχλος, the πολλὸς ὄμιλος, he does not disguise his contempt. It is simply a force to be used. Thukydides as the aristocrat could hardly have been, thinks NESTLE, in sympathy with Perikles' praise of liberty and the equality of all the citizens in the management of the State. These are real forces, not to be underrated so long as they are swayed by genius. The trouble is the inevitable tendency of democracy to the one man power—a τυραννίς in fact, if not in name. Perikles, Kleon, Hyperbolos are the masters; <their rule was a monitory and minatory rule>. As for foreign relations, Thukydides recognizes <as all antiquity recognized, as the language itself shews> that war is the rule and peace the exception. <Ares holds the scales, the grim χρυσαιμοιβός, as Aischylos calls him>. The balance of power is the balance of fear—τὸ ἀντίπαλον δέος. <The doc-

trine holds to-day. Big guns are the Poundtexts>. Sparta and Athens for a time; Sparta or Athens as a rule. Thukydides understood the strength and the weakness of both. The command of the sea was a necessity for Athens. He indulged in no dreams of imperial conquest for Athens. He could have been satisfied with Perikles' sphere of influence. Dreams are only for those who have the power to make the visions realities. Alkibiades was not an Alexander. Thukydides was no Panhellenist. <That was reserved for the renegade Xenophon (A. J. P. XXVI 490). Thukydides was as good an Athenian as Pindar a Boeotian. To Thukydides an Athenian was an Athenian always. No wonder that Thukydides always, like Athens, kept his eye on Corinth—the old mole (A. J. P. XXVIII 356), the old layer of political mines.>

On the influence of Sophistic on the style of Thukydides NESTLE touches but lightly, and as this is the burden of LAMB'S *Clio Enthroned* (Cambridge, University Press)—the rather affected title of a volume dedicated to the study, or, if you choose, vindication of Thukydides as an artist—I may take up the subject in a future *Brief Mention*. Of course, *more Teutonico*, NESTLE'S article is garnished with references to the literature and larded with proof-texts. I have imitated him by citing the Journal. The Thukydidean scholar will not be impressed with the novelty of all his views. NESTLE'S essay belongs to the class of papers for which the world owes so much to the *Neue Jahrbücher* with their wide outlook for the general reader and their pregnant hints for the specialist. I trust that my rapid summary and my ungracious asides have not done injustice to an estimable scholar and to a valuable periodical.

In the Michaelmas semester of 1850 the illustrious Boeckh was lecturing on the History of Greek Literature, and when he came to Sotades, he paused to remark that some people looked upon the universe from the point of view of sexual love; and then he went on to tell us with evident relish the jest that got Sotades into trouble with Ptolemy Philadelphus. It was not a proper joke, and yet an appropriate one, for according to popular etymology the German 'Zote' comes from the Greek Sotades. In this year of grace not some people, but all people, deal in sexualities. The God of the Garden has displaced Max Müller's sun-god. In 1850 Payne Knight was still held up as a man of impure mind because he saw the phallus everywhere in the universe, as he saw the digamma everywhere in Homer. Now everybody seems to be a devotee of Tree-Worship and Serpent-Worship. There are no reserves, and I do not see why I should keep back any longer

an outline or at least an adumbration of my sexual system of the cases (XXXV 109), about which I have had to undergo some good-natured banter. Of course, as I am an old-fashioned man, I must leave the details to be worked out by those who are better equipped both with knowledge and courage.

It is not only yesterday and the day before that I have expressed my dissatisfaction with the scientific methods that have been in vogue since the advent of Delbrück, who took up the clue dropped by Quintilian; and I find no more repose to-day than I did a generation ago (A. J. P. II 83 foll.). The mixed cases are still mixed cases; and it is often impossible to tell which element preponderates in this or that use, all the uses being endowed with metaphysical names—most of which the Greek man in the street would not have understood. No system of the cases could be devised that would transcend the nonsense that has been gravely put forth on the general subject, and not only put forth but accepted. Think, for instance, of the utter absurdity of calling the dative a grammatical case. I lifted my ineffectual toe against it many years ago, and shortly after Whitney came down upon it with his merciless heel. And yet this same Whitney yielded to the temptation of making the accusative a 'whither' case. The local theory is anything but simple, anything but convincing. 'Where' has the murderous habit of killing 'whither'. It has actually exterminated 'whither' in spoken English, and in Spanish the place of 'whither' has been usurped by its opposite 'whence'. Never shall I forget the charming naïveté of the old romance:

Rey de mi alma y desta tierra conde,
¿Porqué me dejas, donde vas, en donde?

Why, instruments of precision are installed in modern vessels in order to determine the direction of sounds, so unsatisfactory is the operation of the human ear. Locality is secondary—not primary. These same localists suffered from an embarrassment of riches when they attacked the problem of the nominative. If the genitive is a whence-case, what is the nominative? A whence-case also. And now comes Van Wijk (A. J. P. XXIII 235) and reinforces Streitberg in maintaining that the original genitive singular is a nominative, differing from the nominative only by a tentacular accent which fastens on the word it wants after the fashion set forth by George Bernard Shaw. The whole moral make-up of the genitive is feminine. It leans, it clings, it twines. Put it at the head of a sentence—as one should say a club—far from its natural régime, and it becomes what they call nowadays a 'bachelor maid'—haply a suffragette, haply a free lover. Looked at from this point of view the genitive absolute ceases to be a

mystery, and the syntactical progress in loose behaviour is a chapter in the emancipation of woman. The grammatico-rhetorical tradition of *ὀρθός* (opp. to *ὑπίσιος*) and *ὀρθότης* sufficiently vindicates the masculinity of the nominative.

The dative, so far from being a grammatical case, is often an ungrammatical case. It flits over a sentence and takes its good where it finds it. It is, to be brief, a *φιλότητι μιγῆναι* case—masculine or feminine, or both. Dr. Fennell heaped scorn upon me for saying that *μιγῆναι* in Pindar always has its rights of <personal> contact, and he declined to put *κεκραμένον* in the same category (P. 5, 2). He is hopelessly wrong. The accusative is not a whither case. It is simply the result of an action. 'To make port', 'to make land', shew the nexus. Now, Johannes Schmidt has taught us that there is no neuter in language. 'It' is simply indeterminate. *τέκνον*, the result of the action of *οἱ τεκόντες*, is differentiated later in *ὁ παῖς* and *ἡ παῖς*. Pseudo-Galen asks *εἰ ζῶν τὸ κατὰ γαστρός*. It was a moot point. But I have written of the mysterious *Es* before (A. J. P. XXV 112). The nominative then is the point of departure, the positive pole. The genitive is the door, the Daleth of the Semites, the delta of the Greeks, the deep well of love (A. J. P. XXV 229), the place within which, the place from within which, emerges the tide of life. The dative is that which gives and takes (Pindar O. 13, 29). The accusative is the resultant, the other pole of activity.

As for the trifling objection that all the four cases under discussion assume masculine or feminine gender, no determined theorist will be balked by that. This assumption of gender belongs to a later period of development. Besides, Brugmann's masterly treatment of grammatical gender has minimized the sexuality of the noun. We must come down from our philosophical altitudes. Too many grammarians are like Renan's Eastern sage, whose name being interpreted means *οὗ τὸ σπέρμα εἰς τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀνέβη*: and we must utter the Aristophanic cry *κατάβα, κατάβα, κατάβα, κατάβα*. But will the response come, *καταβήσομαι*? However, I am forgetting another *κατάβα*, the *κατάβα* addressed to Xanthias by Dionysos, as to a grammarian mounted on his hobby, *κατάβα πανοῦργε*. But, for all that, there is a good omen in the words that follow:

καὶ γὰρ ἐγγὺς τῆς θύρας
ἤδη βαδίζων εἰμὶ τῆσδ', οἱ πρῶτά με
ἔδει τραπέσθαι.

In his *Man and Superman* George Bernard Shaw represents his cultured American as still in the Matthew Arnold stage. That stage is long overpast even on this side. Perhaps the restoration of 'sweetness and light' to Dean Swift, the fatiguing reiteration of Arnold's pet phrases, may have some-

thing to do with it, but I still cling to one of his more or less happy turns, which I used in the Preface to my *Essays and Studies* (1890) and expect to use to the end. The attitude of 'Oriental detachment' is one that I sedulously observe towards all my performances, but more especially towards the school-books of which I was guilty more than forty years ago. The maledictions showered upon my Latin Grammar in the beginning continue to drizzle upon me even in these latter times, as if it were not curse enough for a man of my temperament and early aspirations, to be known chiefly as a schoolboy's *Aeacus* (A. J. P. XXIII 3). And not only so, but I am debarred the privilege of disporting myself in *Brief Mention* at the expense of those who seem to be pillars in Latin Grammar lest perchance I might be thought to be pleading a lost cause—a familiar function for me. Every now and then, however, I take up a Latin school-book and examine the references in order to find out wherein the Gildersleeve-Lodge Grammar falls short of the higher standards of to-day. True, I have protested by precept and example against the practice of disfiguring books by references to grammars which the fewest will take the pains to consult (A. J. P. XXVI III), but I am glad to find that I myself can make practical use of these ugly *sigla*. Now, the latest school-edition that has come into my hands is the *Andria* of Professor STURTEVANT (N. Y., A. B. Co.), in which references are made to seven of the Latin Grammars most in use. To judge by these references no new observation has been made in the last twenty years, the Gildersleeve-Lodge Grammar having appeared in 1894, for the Gildersleeve-Lodge book is represented as meeting every contingency, so that one draws the conclusion that the important thing is not the fact, but the grammarian's interpretation of the fact. At one point, however, the twenty year old book is not cited—v. 303: *Tu si hic sis, aliter sentias*, an example of the Early Latin construction of the present subjunctive, where according to later usage, we should expect the imperfect subjunctive. It is a phenomenon of especial interest to the Grecian who got up the grammar, because it has a parallel in Homeric usage, for Homer, as Professor Goodwin was the first to point out, does not use the unreal indicative conditional of the present. Nor did the Grecian overlook the Latin phenomenon either in 1872 (598 R. 2) or in 1894 (596 R.). In both editions the Terentian passage is quoted, and a translation given which serves to mediate the two subjunctives. It is rather curious that the most Greek of the Latin elegiac poets, Tibullus, uses *ni sint* (i, 4, 64) as one should say for *ni essent*. Here too the imperative sense of the mood is the key to the situation. By the way, I did not use a single verse from Tibullus in my original Latin Grammar—not because I

had not read Tibullus, for at one time I studied him closely in a copy of Dissen's ed. which once belonged to Gottfried Hermann (and was as good as new when I bought it)—but because Tibullus was not rhetorical enough for my purpose, though in the Prosody two of the elegiac distichs are from him. For a different reason I did not cite Persius. Madvig quotes Cicero de Finibus and Livy too often. Such a procedure smacks of the editor. And so I sit in my cave and let the pilgrims to the Heavenly City go by. Whenever I rouse myself, I rouse susceptibilities. So, f. i., I have received angry expostulations against an irrefragable statement that 'futurus esse' in a paradigm is an unpardonable solecism (A. J. P. XXXII 241), and in defiance of my dictum a recent much-lauded grammar teaches the boys to say *audiens esse*. In the same manual the genitive of material is set down as a regular category. It is regular in Greek, but in Latin? Relatively infrequent, says Bennett (E. L. II 12), and disputed to boot. My friend and colleague, Professor Mustard, has set us all to reading Sannazaro. How in the world did those old worthies steer clear of the mines that blow up so many of the Latinists of 1914?

Apropos of grammars and syntaxes Krueger's Greek Grammar is a mirror of his life. The quarrel with his wife, his wrangle with the world, made themselves felt in the examples which he gathered from his Greek authors, and when the examples did not fit, he altered them to suit his mood—and fooled the men who copied him blindly. This was made known to me when I was a student in Berlin sixty odd years ago and it lent a new interest to a book, which gave me my first interest in syntax, and I sometimes wonder how many suspect that there is a human document in a schoolbook that came into the world shortly after the great conflict of the Civil War, out of which the author, who was not a mere compiler, emerged, crippled in body, shattered in fortune, with teeth set hard to meet the stress of fate, his eyes wet with tears for his fallen comrades; and yet with the gleam of a new love reflected in their depths. In the examples of my Latin Grammar of 1867 lies perdu the history of that period of my life. The first page of the Syntax shows my attitude towards the Civil War by a quotation from Ovid, <Non> tam turpe fuit vinciquam contendisse decorum est (A. J. P. XXXV 234), and the poet of love is accountable for many examples of a different kind. The book is a breviary of love. My friend, Professor March, used to say that Hamlet belonged to Shakespeare's earlier period by reason of the large part that love plays in the drama, and anyone interested in the story of my life might recognize my

state of mind in the many quotations from Ovid and Propertius. If the period of disillusionment should ever come, I said to myself, Krueger is at hand.

I was present at the twenty-fifth meeting of the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies in 1904—for me, at least, a memorable occasion. The longest address was by Professor John Williams White, in which he told the story of his palaeographical travels and his studies in the manuscripts of Aristophanes—those studies by which he has made for himself an imperishable name among Aristophanic scholars, who with one accord have yielded to him abundant tribute in accepting his classifications and testifying to his painstaking accuracy. As he spoke, my thoughts went back to my master, Ritschl, and I compared his experiences in the Ambrosian library at Milan (A. J. P. V 348) with the similar trials of Professor White in the Vatican: “It requires strength and resolution”, he said, “to continue this work day after day under the conditions imposed by the place. The hours are short, and one is tempted to work too rapidly; the place is sometimes uncomfortable—the Vatican collating-room, for example, is so cold in January as to give one a new conception of the Roman Catholic Purgatory—and the man who collates grows weary, in spite of himself, and like Homer may fall to nodding, with consequences that are disastrous”. In the course of his talk Professor White gave some specimens of his discoveries, and if the outcome seemed disproportionate to the immense labor, the critical edition of Aristophanes that is to come will doubtless outrank all critical editions of any classic identified with an American name. It is not surprising, then, that in the Introduction to his new edition of *The Acharnians of Aristophanes* (Oxford, Clarendon Press), Mr. ELLIOTT acknowledges his obligations to Professor White, and almost apologizes for anticipating the publication of his text. The title of Mr. ELLIOTT’s edition challenges attention—*The Acharnians of Aristophanes: Edited from the MSS. and Other Original Sources*—and it was my purpose to write an elaborate review of his book, for the Acharnians is an especial favorite of mine—partly because I feel myself better prepared to judge of Aristophanes’ cruder work—and to that end I caused one of my seminary students, Miss SHIELDS, to collate Mr. ELLIOTT’s text with the Hall and Geldart edition. The result was disillusioning in the extreme, and for the present at all events, I am constrained to acquiesce in Mr. BEARE’s judgment as expressed in the last number of *Hermathena*: “Mr. ELLIOTT’s vast industry has not enabled him to make even one certain and valuable restoration, or suggested to him a single brilliant emendation”

This exactness in the handling of manuscript evidence may be set down as what Hegel calls 'ein Produkt der sich selbst denkenden Zeit'. It goes with photography, it goes with instruments of precision; and no wonder that those who excel in it see in it more than the perfect command of material, of which we have another exemplification in statistical methods. In his *Recent Developments of Textual Criticism*, A. C. CLARK, the eminent editor of Cicero, cites with emphatic approval the dictum of Robinson Ellis that 'during the last thirty years all, or nearly all, the principal contributions to an enlarged knowledge of Greek and Latin authors has been based on an investigation of a minute and laborious kind unknown before'.

Und ach! entrollst du gar ein würdig Pergamen,
So steigt der ganze Himmel zu dir nieder.

But the exhaustive mastery of the evidence does not constitute a *Novum Organon*. After as before the requirement of absolute accuracy, the need of penetrating intellect abides. Reiske was a manuscript in himself. Everything depends on the way in which the minutiae are combined, and one is tempted to adapt the old schoolmaster's joke and say: ΔΕΙ <ΟΡΓΑΝΟΥ> ΚΑΙΝΟΥ (καὶ νοῦ).

G. L. H.: The most recent volume of the *Quellen und Untersuchungen zur lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters* (München, 1914) keeps up the standard of the earlier volumes. PAUL LEHMANN, the general editor of the series, gives an interesting study of twenty-five pages on the use of the term "Middle Ages", and the development of the scholarly conception of the study of medieval philology. The greater part of the volume is devoted to what is, in substance, a supplement to the classical edition of Jacques de Vitry's *Exempla* of Professor T. F. Crane. The latter only referred to the manuscripts of the *Sermones communes*, which were to be found recently in Belgian libraries. Two editions of the exempla in these manuscripts appeared last year in Germany, one in Winter's *Sammlung mittellateinischer Texte*, edited by Dr. Josef Greven, the other, the one in hand, the work of Dr. GOSWIN FRENKEN, which is superior on account of the long introduction on the general use of exempla, and the source of de Vitry's stories (1-87). There is plenty of occasion for comment on two subjects covering such a wide field, but the correction of a few omissions and mistakes will suffice here. In the account of the use of exempla in antiquity (5 ff.), there is

no reference to the best that has been already written on the subject by H. Peter (*Wahrheit und Kunst, Geschichtschreibung und Plagiat im klassisch. Altertum*, 162 ff., 169), and E. Stemplinger (*Das Plagiat in der griechisch. Literatur*, 223 ff.). The date of the composition of the Pseudo-Aristotelian *Secretum Secretorum* is not about 1300 (78); the Latin translation of this Arabic work was made a century earlier, as is shown by the use made of it in the *Liber physiognomiae* of Michael Scot, to whom Dr. FRENKEN wishes to deny the authorship of the *Mensa philosophica* which cites the *Secretum* frequently. It has also escaped his attention that de Vitry gives (128) from his personal experience, and with monkish acidity, an account of a French practice, anterior by a century and a half, to the allusion to the Dunmow flitch of bacon in *Piers Ploughman*, the earliest instance of the custom that has been pointed out. Then, again, Dr. FRENKEN has not pointed out that de Vitry has only given a monastic setting (140-1) to the story of the father who deceived his ungrateful sons by the use of chests containing stones (cf. Knowles, *Folk Tales of Kashmir*, 241; J. Geffcken, *Der Bildercatechismus des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts*, 71; Herbert, *Cat. of Romances*, 486, 653).

R. V. D. M.: Professor Barbagallo's name appears with increasing frequency on monographs which deal with various phases of classical history. His latest work [Un Semestre d'Impero Repubblicano. Il governo di Galba (giugno, 68-15 gennaio, 69) Napoli, 1914. Pp. 89.] is a pamphlet on the emperor Galba. There is not much that is new in this presentation, and the author has not been able to refrain from giving overmuch prominence to the latterly lurid career of Nero. He has confined himself to a comprehensive and comparative examination of the literary evidence and has made a very neat summary, not without flashes of inspiration and clever turns of phrase, of six months of a time quite entirely "out of joint".

Professor Barbagallo makes it quite clear that Galba came to the throne with high ideals, but that he was not able to reconcile to himself the establishment of high ideals by high-handed means. He sent his own soldiers away, which was foolish; he did not give largesses to the praetorians, which was fatuous; and he announced as his successor a young and untried man, which was futile; and so he was killed before he had evinced any inclination to try to get into touch with the times.

This monograph is another of its author's many carefully

written sketches which treat of short periods in Roman imperial history. Professor Barbagallo is probably publishing chapters of a projected book.

It must be said, however, that there is not much to be gleaned in the field of literary sources. It is to epigraphy and numismatics that the Roman historian is turning now for new material. Professor Barbagallo will be interested in an article soon to be published by an American woman who by her study of coins has cleared up several matters hitherto in dispute regarding the years 68-70 A. D.

F. E.: Not only Indologists, but all persons interested in folk-psychology and cultural history, should welcome the publication by Dr. VON NEGELEIN of *Jagaddeva's Svapnacintāmani* ("Der Traumschlüssel des Jagaddeva", Giessen, 1912). The painstaking and industrious editor has not contented himself with publishing a critical text with careful translation of this, perhaps the most important of Hindu treatises on dreams. This in itself would have been a valuable work, and by no means an easy one, for—as the editor complains, p. XVIII—the language of the text is often purposely obscure, and corruptions are not rare. But he has enriched his work and greatly increased its value by a wealth of parallels from other Indian sources (enumerated p. XIX), contained in voluminous notes which seem pretty well to justify the claim (p. XX): Das Gegebene genügt vollauf, die Kenntnis des indischen Traumaberglaubens dem Indologen wie auch dem Religionsforscher zu erschliessen. It is to be regretted that Dr. von NEGELEIN did not add to the book an alphabetical index to the first lines of stanzas contained in his book: this would have made its use as a book of handy reference easier. I have tried in a small way to test the completeness of the collection of materials by looking up in the *Traumschlüssel* the verses on dreams found in the *Vikramacarita* (a work not used by von NEGELEIN), which number about ten. Four of them I find quoted word for word, though they do not occur in the *Svapnacintāmani* itself, from parallel texts¹: and there are close parallels for the ideas contained in all the others, with one exception. This exception is all the more surprising because it is the only verse in the *Vikr.* which is definitely stated to be a quotation from a "book of dreams" (*svapnādhyāya*), and yet I have failed to find not only the verse itself, but any ref-

¹ On account of the lack of an index of first lines mentioned above, I cannot be sure that I have not overlooked the occurrence of some others.

erence to any similar conception in VON NEGELEIN. The verse is the following (Southern Recension 4. 6) :

*devo dviṣo gurur gāvah pitaro līṅginas tathā
yad vadanti vacaḥ svaṇe tat tathāiva vinirdiṣet.*

Which may be freely translated : One should resolve to follow strictly the advice, given in a dream, by a god, a brahman, a teacher, cows, ancestors and bearers of *līṅgas*.—Of course, Dr. VON NEGELEIN cannot be blamed for not printing what his text does not contain, and these remarks are not intended as in any way a reflection on his admirable and highly important work. But this chance find of mine may perhaps be taken to indicate that in spite of the richness of his collection, there may remain phases of the dream-superstition in India which it happens not to touch upon.—An index of words found in the *Svapnacintāmani* itself, and a systematic *Inhaltsverzeichnis*, help to make the book usable.